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HIV-prevention strategies have yielded only limited 
success so far in slowing down the AIDS epidemic. This 
paper examines novel intervention strategies that use 
incentives to discourage risky sexual behaviors. Widely-
adopted conditional cash transfer programs that offer 
payments conditioning on easily monitored behaviors, 
such as well-child health care visits, have shown positive 
impact on health outcomes. Similarly, contingency 
management approaches have successfully used outcome-
based rewards to encourage behaviors that are not easily 
monitored, such as stopping drug abuse. These strategies 
have not been used in the sexual domain, so this paper 
assesses how incentives can be used to reduce risky 
sexual behavior. After discussing theoretical pathways, 
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it discusses the use of sexual-behavior incentives in the 
Tanzanian RESPECT trial. There, participants who 
tested negative for sexually transmitted infections are 
eligible for outcome-based cash rewards. The trial was 
well-received in the communities, with high enrollment 
rates and more than 90 percent of participants viewing 
the incentives favorably. After one year, 57 percent of 
enrollees in the “low-value” reward arm stated that the 
cash rewards “very much” motivated sexual behavioral 
change, rising to 79 percent in the “high-value” reward 
arm. Despite its controversial nature, the authors argue 
for further testing of such incentive-based approaches to 
encouraging reductions in risky sexual behavior. 
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Conventional approaches to HIV prevention have been important in educating 
populations about HIV risk factors and risk reduction strategies, and many have been 
found to be cost-effective, but by themselves they have had limited success in slowing 
the AIDS epidemic.  Over the past decade the annual number of new infections has 
decreased by about one-fifth, but in 2009 there were still an estimated 2.6 million new 
HIV infections, and 1.8 million of these were in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2010).  
HIV experts have highlighted the need for new combination approaches to complement 
existing prevention efforts (Coates et al. 2008; Padian et al. 2011), including efforts to 
stimulate individual demand for prevention.   
This paper considers the use of economic incentives to encourage people to 
engage in behavioral change strategies that reduce risky sexual behaviors.  Incentives 
have been widely used in a variety of related domains, but are only recently being 
explored as a possible HIV prevention strategy.  One type of widely adopted incentive 
scheme in the health domain is as part of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs such 
as the well-known Oportunidades program in Mexico, which provides significant cash 
welfare support to households that engage in specific positive behaviors including 
appropriate prenatal and well-child care.  Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer (2007) and 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) survey such programs in detail.  Related programs are being 
explored in the Sub-Saharan African context, but with conditionality focused on non-
health behaviors such as schooling (which can then indirectly yield positive health 
consequences), e.g. Baird et al. (2010).  There is also a history of providing positive price 
incentives for using specific types of preventive health services, most relevant in this 
context being the use of cash incentives to promote receipt of HIV test results (Thornton, 
2008).  The aforementioned incentive programs are all conditioned on observable input 
behaviors, which can be controlled by participants.  A parallel set of ―contingency 
management‖ programs have been designed for situations in which behavior changes are 
more complex and/or not easily observed, and in which conditionality is instead based on   3 
outcomes.  This contingency management approach has been most widely adopted in the 
substance abuse field, e.g. providing rewards to substance abuse treatment patients if they 
are negative on random drug tests; such programs have been found in developed country 
contexts to be feasible, acceptable, and effective (Stitzer, 2006). 
In this paper we discuss a variant of the above incentive programs, using 
outcome-based incentives adapted to the sexual domain (possibly within the context of a 
larger CCT program).  After reviewing traditional HIV prevention strategies as well as 
what is known from prior literature on incentives in the types of contexts discussed above 
(drawn partly from Medlin and de Walque, 2008), we discuss the theoretical pathways by 
which incentive programs could work to reduce risky sexual behavior.  We then turn to a 
specific example in detail, elaborating on one such project in Tanzania (the RESPECT 
Project, of which the authors are the principal investigators) which has implemented a 
novel randomized trial of outcome-based incentives to reduce risky sexual behavior.
1  
RESPECT was a one-year intervention in which participants were tested for curable 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) at four-month intervals, and received cash rewards 
if STI negative.  The results from the impact evaluation of this intervention are reported 
in de Walque et al, 2012.  Figure 1 presents the basic randomized design of the 
RESPECT study‘s 2399 participants across two treatments arms (with different levels of 
cash rewards) and a control arm.  The balance of the paper focuses on lessons learned 
from the RESPECT trial and implications for future such efforts.  
 
Traditional Approaches to HIV Prevention 
The social, economic, and human costs of the AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are staggering (Eiss and Glass, 2007), and innovative solutions to stem the tide of 
the epidemic are desperately needed.  Globally, an estimated 33 million people were 
living with HIV in 2009.  That same year, an estimated 1.8 million people lost their lives 
to AIDS, and an estimated 2.6 million became newly infected.  The global epicenter of 
                                                 
1 We are only aware of one other study that has attempted to similarly incentive outcomes associated with 
risky sexual behaviors.  Kohler and Thornton (2011) report on a trial in Malawi in which HIV negative 
individuals were randomized to cash reward levels to be paid one year later conditional on remaining HIV 
negative.  In contrast to the RESPECT study which found significant reductions in STIs, the Malawi study 
found null results on HIV conversion (the main measured outcome), although there was low power to 
detect HIV changes in that study.   4 
the AIDS pandemic is in Africa, where an estimated 22.5 million people were living with 
HIV in 2009 including approximately 5% of adults, and an estimated 1.8 million new 
infections occurred during that year (UNAIDS, 2010).  Young people, aged 15-25, are at 
particularly high risk of new infection.  
The tragic reality is that many of these new infections could have been prevented.  
At its core, the global AIDS epidemic is fueled by risky sexual behavior.  Over 80% of 
HIV infections occur through sexual contact with an infected partner (Askew and Berer, 
2003), and could have been avoided through the adoption of safer sexual behaviors 
including condom use, reduction in the number and concurrency of sexual partners, or 
abstinence. 
Since the early years of the epidemic and beyond, billions of dollars have been 
invested in prevention programs, and a significant portion of these dollars have gone to 
what are known as ―Information, Education, and Communications‖ (IEC) investments.  
Unfortunately, IEC by itself has not been shown to have more than a minor impact on 
patterns of HIV transmission and the trajectory of the epidemic (Bertrand et al., 2006).  
Numerous studies have shown that information alone is typically insufficient to change 
risk behavior.  Accurate information is indisputably a basic ingredient in informed policy 
discourse, and information, education, and communication campaigns in conjunction 
with condom promotion and distribution likely results in higher condom use and 
significantly lower sexually transmitted infection (STI) incidence (Bertozzi et al., 2006).  
Behavioral change will need to be an important part of prevention strategies going 
forward.  But the dearth of specific guidance and recommendations from the literature 
about what can be done to improve the effectiveness of behavioral change interventions 
especially as they relate to risky sexual behavior has been one of the more poignant 
failures of global response to the epidemic.   
Certain other key AIDS prevention strategies do not depend on the widespread 
adoption of safe sexual practices, but they nevertheless will depend on individual demand 
decisions to use available technologies.  These include HIV and STI testing and 
treatment, male circumcision, and pharmacological prevention including drugs to stop 
mother-to-child transmission, vaginal microbicides, prophylactic antivirals, and 
potentially a future vaccine (Padian et al., 2011).  Such clinical and technologically-based   5 
approaches hold a great deal of promise; however, behavioral strategies must also be 
pursued.  Current levels of investment in the development of new drugs, vaccines, and 
technologies have been at least partially fueled by the perception that behaviorally-
focused approaches cannot be made to work, or are politically and socially unviable.  
However, biomedical advances such as a cure for AIDS or the development of an 
effective AIDS vaccine are, at best, many years away or unattainable.  Moreover, even 
once a clinic-based intervention, drug, or vaccine has been proven efficacious, changes in 
behavior are still needed to ensure access, uptake, and acceptability.  Consequently, 
greater attention is now being given to a focus on behavioral change as an important 
component of prevention strategies and activities.   
In the Tanzanian context in which the RESPECT trial was fielded, Table 1 shows 
that knowledge of AIDS and HIV prevention strategies is extremely high and accurate, 
with over 99% of respondents familiar with HIV and 85% identifying condom usage as a 
strategy to prevent HIV.  Table 2 further shows that a large portion of young adults have 
been HIV tested (a national testing campaign occurred two years earlier and testing is 
standard during prenatal care), and people believe that HIV rates are quite high.  The 
average respondent estimated an HIV prevalence rate of 17% among people their age in 
their village, indicating a high level of perceived risk.  Yet table 2 also shows 20% of 
men admitting to multiple partners in the past month (we suspect such statistics are 
underreported), and close to half of participants failed to use a condom during their last 
sexual intercourse with a non-marital partner.  These young people appear to understand 
their HIV risks and know how to behave to prevent transmission – yet they don‘t choose 
to act on that knowledge.  Next we review prior experience with incentivizing individuals 
so as to stimulate demand for prevention. 
 
Literature Review on Incentives for Health Input Behaviors and Health Outcomes 
 
Conditional Cash Transfer Approaches 
CCT programs which provide cash to poor households in exchange for their 
active participation in educational and health care services have proven remarkably 
popular among developing country governments, sweeping the globe from Mexico to   6 
several other Latin American countries, including Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and 
Nicaragua, and much more recently, to Africa (Kakwani et al., 2005; Nigenda and 
Gonzalez-Robledo, 2005; Schuring, 2005).  The principle of conditionality – which may 
be applied differently in practice, but generally requires families to send their children to 
school or to receive a range of health care services, such as nutritional counseling, 
childhood vaccination programs, etc. – distinguishes CCT programs from the more 
traditional social assistance programs which provide cash or vouchers directly to poor or 
otherwise distressed families with no strings attached.  The CCT programs emphasize the 
use of market-oriented ―demand-side‖ interventions as an instrument for longer-term 
human capital investments (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  In 
other words, the cash was intended to function as an incentive on credit-constrained 
(poor) families to invest in their children‘s future, recognizing the powerful limitations 
that short-term financial constraints placed on poor families.  Ideally, they are designed to 
complement, rather than replace, the more familiar ―supply-side‖ investments which 
channel resources directly towards schools, clinics, and service providers.     
The CCT programs that have received the most attention are those having an 
explicit orientation toward poverty alleviation, involving both educational and health 
components as part of a broader, long-term strategy of human capital investments.  Such 
programs have been thoroughly evaluated, and overall the results of these programs have 
been extremely promising.  The evaluations of such programs, some more rigorously 
designed than others, have generally shown positive impacts on health and education.  
Mexico‘s program has been evaluated most thoroughly.  Studies have found increases of 
25-60% in health care visits among children under 3 years, higher rates of nutritional 
monitoring, and higher immunization rates.  In addition, caloric intake increased by 7 
percent, driven by higher expenditures on fruits, vegetables, and meats. Actual health 
impacts have also been observed, with 12 percent lower incidence of illness among 
children from 0-5 years old, and a height increase of one centimeter among children aged 
6-36 months (with the greatest effects in the poorest households with educated fathers) 
(Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2007).  However, very little can be surmised about the 
relationship between the magnitude of the transfer and the behavioral effect it induces 
due to the lack of experimentation with this issue.  Fernald et al. (2008a, 2008b) have   7 
instead used quasi-experimental variation in the magnitude of Mexico‘s Oportunidades 
cash transfer to indicate that more cash is associated with better child anthropometric and 
cognitive outcomes (though worse adult blood pressure and obesity). 
Beyond the lack of information related to cash dose response, there is also an 
intense debate regarding the importance of the conditionality component of such 
programs.  Some have argued that the conditionality component is inappropriate for the 
African context (Schubert and Slater, 2006).  Even in the Latin American context, it has 
been recognized that it is difficult to attribute health impact to the conditionality, per se, 
as the programmatic intervention has many component parts, and is not limited to the 
conditionality (Gertler 2004; Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2007).  In the absence of 
more definitive research, related programs in several countries have been launched 
without conditionality, including some in Africa.  Several more recent studies are now 
analyzing conditionality compared to randomized arms with unconditional cash 
payments, yielding sometimes surprising results.  For example, Baird, McIntosh, and 
Ozler (2011) find that conditionality improves adolescent girl school outcomes in a CCT 
program in Malawi, but increased teen pregnancy and marriage rates relative to 
unconditional transfers.  More will be known to help interpret these complex 
relationships as additional studies such as this are released in the near future.  
Overall, the evidence from an impressive collection of evaluations of CCTs as 
part of a broader poverty alleviation strategy demonstrates that such programs are 
feasible and effective.  Such programs have demonstrated positive impacts on uptake 
rates of health (and education) services, and, in some cases, marked improvements in 
health outcomes (Sridhar and Duffield, 2006, review nutritional outcomes in particular).  
However, it is important to note that the evidence on how and whether the conditionality 
works remains weak.  For STI/HIV prevention, this is the most critical piece of 
information that is needed to assess whether similar types of programs can be effective at 
reducing risky sexual behavior.  To explore the role of conditionality in more detail we 
next turn to contingency management approaches, which typically use much smaller 
payments that would be unlikely to have income effects on behavior, and thus better 
isolate the role of the conditionality incentive per se. 
   8 
Contingency Management Approaches 
Similar to CCTs, contingency management (CM) relies on the mechanism of 
conditionality to elicit behaviors that are viewed to be in one‘s long-term interests (or 
those of society), and to discourage those behaviors that may be ultimately detrimental to 
one‘s own health and well-being that may not be easily perceived or experienced in the 
short term.  There are several key differences between CCT and CM though.  First, CCT 
programs typically have much larger cash rewards for complying with conditionality, 
hence exploit both price and income and effects on behavior.  Second, CCT programs 
have typically conditioned on easily monitored input behaviors (such as health care use), 
whereas CM has been used for behaviors that are harder to monitor directly (such as drug 
use), and hence CM conditions instead on the desired outcome (negative drug test).  
Third, while the CCT incentivized inputs (a prenatal care visit) require a ―simple‖ 
behavioral response over which the individual has a high degree of control, CM 
incentives often require a ―complex‖ behavioral change (over which the individual may 
have imperfect control) (Kane et al., 2004).  This complexity may require changing 
multiple behaviors, reversing habit formation and addictive behaviors, and judging 
uncertainty (such as probability that a behavior will indeed cause a negative test). 
CM applications span many areas of risky behaviors, including substance abuse, 
smoking, and over-eating.  It has been especially well studied by clinical psychologists as 
a therapeutic approach to encourage the practice of healthful behaviors, and to discourage 
unhealthy behavioral practices, especially those that may be linked to addiction or other 
destructive behaviors that are deeply engrained and/ or habit-forming.  CM interventions 
provide ―reinforcers‖ (e.g. incentives or rewards) contingent on an individual‘s 
abstinence from a target drug or behavior.  The reinforcement device, often cash 
payments, vouchers, or prizes, is contingent upon an objective measure of a 
predetermined therapeutic target.  An ―objective‖ measure often means a biochemical 
measure such as urine toxicology testing or the measurement of breath alcohol or carbon 
monoxide levels, instead of self-reported compliance which is not verifiable. 
The essential principles of CM, as outlined by Petry (2000), are to reinforce the 
treatment goals by 1) closely monitoring the target behavior; 2) providing tangible, 
positive reinforcement of the target behavior; and 3) removing the positive reinforcement   9 
when the target behavior does not occur.  CM techniques have been developed and tested 
in the context of clinical trials and settings, and are a clinically accepted tool in fields 
such as substance abuse, but have rarely (if ever) been implemented on a large scale in 
the manner of CCT programs.   
As with CCTs, CM interventions have been tied to participation and the uptake of 
services in several domains, although risk behaviors are the important determinant for 
participant selection, rather than income constraints.  CM has been shown to improve 
drug abuse outcomes (Rawson et al., 2002) and uptake rates of counseling sessions (Petry 
et al., 2001b); attendance at weight loss sessions; attendance at HIV drop-in center 
activities (Petry et al., 2001a) and antiviral medication adherence (Rosen et al., 2007); 
and attendance in smoking cessation clinics (e.g., see Higgins et al., 1994; Petry, 2000; 
and Emont and Cummings, 1992).  Of particular interest, however, is the use of CM to 
elicit a complex behavioral change – usually, to discourage an unhealthy behavior by 
positively reinforcing the cessation of that activity (e.g. drug or alcohol abuse, smoking, 
or over-eating).  The conceptual basis of CM and CCTs is thus largely similar, although 
advocates of CM impose no a priori assumptions about the effectiveness of the use of 
cash as the incentive or reinforcement device, and have experimented with a variety of 
reward mechanisms, including vouchers and prizes.
2  In addition, many CM studies are 
designed to explore effect differences due to variations in the value of the conditionality 
(known as the ―dose-response‖ curve), the frequency of monitoring and payments, and 
the length of time that the elicited behavior change is sustained after the program has 
ended.    
The use of CM has been most intensively studied in relation to its efficacy in 
treating substance abuse.  A landmark study by Higgins et al. (1994) demonstrated that 
incentives delivered contingent on submitting cocaine-free urine specimens significantly 
improved treatment outcomes in ambulatory cocaine-dependent patients.  Over 50 
percent in the treatment condition achieved at least two months of cocaine abstinence 
versus only 15 percent of the controls.  Silverman et. al. (1996) showed that 47 percent of 
                                                 
2 The findings of studies reviewed for this paper suggested that cash is typically preferred by research 
subjects, and in some studies it has been shown to have a greater behavioral effect than the equivalent non-
cash reward (Kamb et al., 1998; Deren et al., 1994; Vandrey et al., 2007), although the findings are hardly 
conclusive.   10 
cocaine abusing methadone patients assigned to the CM group achieved more than 7 
weeks of continuous abstinence, compared to only 6 percent of patients in the control 
group who achieved more than 2 weeks of abstinence.  Similar results have been found 
for treating opioid dependency (Petry, 2000).  While CM has also been shown efficacious 
in treating alcohol abuse, the studies are fewer in number due to the difficulties 
associated with objectively verifying abstinence.  Breath, urine, and blood tests can detect 
alcohol use only up to four to eight hours, which means that effective monitoring would 
have to take place two or three times a day (Stitzer and Petry, 2006). 
Financial incentives to discourage smoking have also been extensively studied.  
Donatelle et al (2000) used social support and financial incentives to induce high risk 
pregnant smokers to quit during their pregnancies.  They provided in the amount of $50 
per month for each month of abstinence (up to a maximum 10 month period, which 
included two months of postpartum).  Lab-verified abstinence was required, and the 
biochemically-confirmed quit rates within the treatment group were higher both at 8 
months and 2 months postpartum.  Stitzer (1983) experimented with different levels of 
cash payment, providing a payment of $1, $5, or $10 per day for 10 days to the three 
treatment groups (the control group received no cash).  The study found that CO levels 
decreased in an orderly fashion as pay increased.  However, another study by Windsor et 
al. (1988) which provided cash payments of $25 at 6 weeks and 6 months as a reward for 
abstinence found no different in cessation rates between the control and treatment groups.  
Other earlier studies experimenting with prizes, vouchers, and in-kind gifts of free 
nicotine patches showed mixed results, but even positive results disappeared after 6 
months.  More recently, Volpp et al. (2009) found that while an incentive program‘s 
effects on smoking cessation also declined after withdrawal of the incentives, significant 
effects did still remain 3-6 months later. 
The use of financial incentives to treat obesity has also gained in popularity, but 
the evidence regarding efficacy is decidedly more mixed (see e.g. Follick et al., 1984; 
Jeffery et al., 1978; and Jeffery et al., 1984.  E.g., Volpp et al. (2008) found significant 
weight loss from a lottery-based incentive program, but they were not sustained 4-months 
after the program‘s end; similarly, John et al. (2011) found matched commitment 
contracts led to significant weight loss after 36 weeks, but again it was not sustained   11 
during a 32-week post-incentive period.  A recent systematic review of randomized 
controlled trials of treatments for obesity (Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2007) showed 
no significant effect of the use of financial incentives on weight loss or maintenance at 12 
months and 18 months.  However, further sub-analysis indicated that large transfers 
(greater than 1.2% of personal disposable income) had greater impact, as did rewards for 
behavioral change rather than weight loss, per se, and rewards based on group 
performance rather than individual results. 
The CM literature, overall, offers useful insights into aspects of the conditionality 
that appear to elicit the desired behavior change.  This is an important area of inquiry that 
has not been sufficiently explored within CCT programs.  However, unlike CCT 
programs, studies of CM have remained largely experimental and have not been brought 
to scale (Petry, 2000; Kane et al., 2004).  Furthermore, the small sample sizes of study 
groups – most typically involving groups of 20 to 100, and rarely more than 500 – have 
made it difficult to detect effects that are statistically significant, much less estimate 
effect sizes accurately.  Also, factorial designs with several treatment arms are common 
which – in combination with already small sample sizes – has led to even more 
constraints on power (Kane et al., 2004). 
 
Theoretical Pathways for Incentive Effects on Risky Sexual Behaviors 
  As indicated in the above literature review, there are a variety of theoretical 
pathways via which incentives could influence risky sexual behaviors.  In the STI 
domain, such behaviors might include sexual behavior (abstinence, fewer partners, less 
risky partners, condom use, pressure spouse/partner to reduce risky behaviors) as well as 
testing and treatment behaviors (regular STI testing, STI treatment, and encouraging 
partner to do the same).  In this section we focus on behavioral changes induced 
particularly by incentives such as those employed in the RESPECT study: cash rewards 
conditional on testing negative for STIs.   
   
Neoclassical Price Effect 
Neoclassical economics predicts that the incentives will influence behavior in part 
via a price effect.  Conditioning the reward on STI status increases the implicit ―price‖ of   12 
risky sex, since there is now a potential loss of cash associated with risky behaviors.  This 
theory assumes rational decision-making in the sexual domain (Philipson and Posner, 
1995).  The idea that individuals make tradeoffs between price and the riskiness of sex is 
consistent with Gertler et al. (2005) who find Mexican sex workers charge higher prices 
for sex without condoms, and Robinson and Yeh (2011) who find that sex workers 
charge more for anal sex.  This of course does not indicate that individuals are perfectly 
rational in such decisions, but lends credence to the idea that people do respond to sex 
prices.  However, this price effect may be muted by the fact that not all risky behaviors 
will result in a positive STI test, so the expected loss may be lower than the reward value.  
In the RESPECT trial, approximately ten percent of individuals tested positive at each 
timepoint, thus a person of average risk who mixes with average risk partners could have 
an expected loss of only one-tenth of the reward amount.  For example, the RESPECT 
study‘s higher cash reward amount of $20 might yield only a $2 ―price‖ of risky sex 
during a four month period, which by itself could be a weak spur to behavioral change. 
   
Neoclassical Income Effects 
To the extent that health is a normal good, the rewards may change behavior 
through income effects, particularly with increasing value of cumulative repeated 
rewards.  However, in many CM applications, the reward amounts are sufficiently small 
as to preclude neoclassical income effects.  In the RESPECT study, the rewards over one 
year can be as high as 25% of mean annual earnings, which is a substantial amount.  For 
some lower income women this could indeed ameliorate immediate economic pressures 
to engage in transactional sex, although there is mixed evidence on the size and even sign 
of the income effect on risky sexual behaviors.  For men in particular, it is often 
hypothesized that higher income will lead to more transactional sex, which over time 
would mute the incentive effects on male sexual behaviors. 
   
Systematic Cognitive Errors 
Some individuals may not be able to accurately perform the expected value 
calculations discussed above.  Limited numeracy, availability heuristics, and bounded 
rationality may make some people particularly prone to systematic over-estimation of   13 
small STI probabilities (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Thus they may behave 
as if the expected loss is substantially higher than it truly is.    
   
High Discounting 
In a society with a generalized AIDS epidemic (Tanzania has an estimated 6% 
adult prevalence rate), the expected cost of an AIDS diagnosis might be considered far 
larger than the modest cash rewards offered.  For individuals who are present-focused 
and heavily discount the future though, the prospect of an AIDS diagnosis many years in 
the future may not be considered a high cost.  But if the price of risky sex would be 
incurred within months instead (the RESPECT study tested and offered cash rewards 
every four months), then high discounters may perceive an increased (discounted) price 
of risky sex, and thus behaviorally respond to this shortening of the time horizon.  This of 
course depends on the extent of high discounting; studies in this context (including 
measures in the RESPECT study) have found extremely high rates of discounting, 
implying that even a timeframe of months may result in substantial discounting of the 
potential reward value.  And a reward in the timeframe of months may have little impact 
on those risky sexual behaviors that may be driven by strong hyperbolic discounting 
(similar to the concept of compulsive immediate gratification used in developmental 
psychology) as discussed in the behavioral economics literature (O‘Donoghue and Rabin, 
2001). 
   
Other “Nudges” 
A variety of other behavioral economics and psychological hypotheses have been 
proposed regarding the operation of incentives, now sometimes referred to as ―nudges‖ 
following the popularization of the term by Thaler and Sunstein (2008).  For example, 
some argue that introducing explicit monetary incentives into the sexual decision-making 
process may alter the frame within which people assess costs and benefits, resulting in 
unpredictable deviations from neoclassical theory.  Others suggest that the incentives 
provide individuals with an excuse for deviating from social norms in order to act on 
underlying preferences for less risky behavior.  Several such theories would predict a 
discontinuity of the dose-response relationship at zero: the first positive reward amount   14 
should have much larger behavioral effects than subsequent amounts.  Designing studies 
with multiple reward amounts (RESPECT used $20, $10, $0) will be particularly 
important for testing such hypotheses. 
 
  In addition to the above discussed pathways for behavioral change in response to 
the incentives, it is also useful to consider potential long-term effects of time-limited 
incentives.  Two competing hypotheses are of particular interest: 
 
Learning 
For behaviors which individuals may not have tried until encouraged to by the 
incentives (e.g., use of condoms), it is possible that the incentives will induce learning 
(and reinforcement) that could result in permanent positive behavior changes even after 
withdrawal of the incentives.   
 
Reduced Intrinsic Motivation 
Alternatively, psychologists have emphasized the potentially pernicious effects of 
extrinsic monetary incentives in destroying the intrinsic desire to engage in positive 
behaviors.  Cameron et al. (2001) reviews the literature on the possible destruction of 
intrinsic incentives and concludes that while this might occur for some high-interest 
tasks, in general incentives do not have pervasive adverse effects.   
 
RESPECT Study: Design Considerations and Lessons Learned 
  In this section we highlight major considerations in designing a sexual behavior 
incentive study, providing rationale for choices made in designing RESPECT, so as assist 
others in designing similar studies in the future.  Table 3 provides 2009 baseline 
summary statistics on key variables discussed below.  Further details of the RESPECT 
study are described elsewhere (de Walque et al., 2012).   
 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical concerns permeated all aspects of project planning, as referred to in many 
of the subsequent sections.  The use of incentives in the sexual arena raises many   15 
potential controversial issues, so it is also natural that there will be disagreement 
regarding ethical considerations, both across individuals and across cultural settings, thus 
it is essential to have careful oversight and scrutiny of the research design and protocols.  
The project underwent several rounds of ethical review by several different committees 
and agencies, including the IRBs of the University of California, Berkeley and San 
Francisco, the Ifakara Health Institute, and the National Institute for Medical Research in 
Tanzania (NIMR).  In addition, the study benefited from a (largely Tanzanian) ethical 
advisory group that reviewed the study protocol. 
 
Target Population 
A key decision point is whether to target the general population of some region, 
or target a particular high risk group.  The intervention may be on average more effective 
among high risk groups, but potentially have a smaller aggregate impact.  The RESPECT 
study chose to target a general population.  A pilot study by Galarraga (in process) in 
Mexico City is alternatively exploring the possibility for targeting a group of male sex 
workers.  One concern with targeting a group such as sex workers is the political 
constraint to scaling up implementation due to stigma and/or the concern about the 
rewards attracting people to sex work; however the income value of sex work is likely to 
swamp the value of incentive payments, making that concern less salient.   
In order to ease study logistics, RESPECT chose to implement the intervention 
within the context of Ifakara Health and Demographic Surveillance Site in rural 
southwestern Tanzania.  We chose to recruit from ten villages; eight were rural and two 
were in Ifakara town.  Rural villages are generally lower income, so a given reward level 
is likely to be more salient.  Due to the limited number of villages, study arm 
randomization occurred at the individual level. 
Demographically, we chose to enroll both men and women, as both could 
hypothetically respond to the program.  A priori, there were concerns that women might 
not have sufficient agency to respond to the incentive regimen, while there were concerns 
that men‘s responses could be dulled if they used cash rewards to pay for new risky 
behaviors, thus it was of interest to study both genders.  We also chose to enroll both   16 
single and married individuals, and married individuals were issued invitations for their 
spouse to join the study as well (in the same intervention arm).   
Regarding age group, we initially sought to enroll 15-24 year olds (a particularly 
high risk age group), but due to ethical concerns we decided not to enroll minors, thus our 
final target range was 18-30 year olds (plus all spouses ages 16 or older). 
For recruitment we chose a random sample of village residents from the 
demographic surveillance site computer registry, and went to each of their houses to 
explain the study and invite them to participate by reporting to a study station set up in 
their village the following week.  Of individuals who were reached in their houses for 
recruitment, approximately 70% came to the study station and enrolled.  Thus the 
enrolled sample is highly representative of the general population of 18-30 year olds in 
these villages.  Table 3 further shows that only 6.5% of enrollees attrited or were lost to 
follow-up during the one-year intervention.  Attriters were younger and more likely to be 
single, but overall means of those choosing to complete the study were quite similar to 
attriters, except for the fact that attriters were substantially more likely to be HIV positive 
at baseline (with 21% of HIV positives attriting, possibly due to confusion about 
continued study eligibility).  With this exception, the study sample was highly 
representative of the underlying population. 
 
Conditionality Design 
A primary goal of the study was to reduce risky sexual behaviors.  But because 
these were not directly verifiable, we instead opted to link cash payments to objective 
measures – STI test results – that could serve as (imperfect) proxies for risky sexual 
behavior.  Ideally we wished to condition on only STIs which have been incontrovertibly 
linked to solely risky sexual activity.  We also needed to balance cost considerations with 
the imperative to have enough tests so as to sufficiently capture risky behavior.  In 
addition, we needed to consider local knowledge of STIs, testing capacity, and 
availability of appropriate drugs with low rates of treatment failure.  Because RESPECT 
was designed as a ―proof of concept‖ to detect whether or not individuals appeared to 
responded to this type of incentives related to sexual behavior, we chose to conduct an 
expansive set of tests.  These were: Chlamydia, gonorrhea, trichomonas, Mycoplasma   17 
genitalium, syphilis and HSV2.  Each had unique considerations:  Chlamydia and 
gonorrhea were well known among the target population, thus although they ended up 
having relatively low prevalence overall, they were useful to include due to their salience 
in the target population.  Trichomonas has the merit of fairly high prevalence (and 
presumed incidence), although additional complications are introduced by the fact that it 
is biologically more common among women than men.  Mycoplasma genitalium is also a 
high prevalence STI, but has the drawbacks that it is not well known (many clinicians in 
this setting are unaware of it), there are no rapid tests for it, and treatment failure rates are 
not well understood; for these reasons we opted not to condition rewards on this STI, but 
still measured it for the purposes of increasing statistical analysis power.   
For highly reliable measurement of these first four STIs, every four months we 
collected urine samples from men and vaginal swabs from women (performed by a local 
nurse after careful explanation and consent—acceptability of swabs did not turn out to be 
problematic), and conducted assays using nucleic acid amplification tests (NAAT) at the 
Ifakara Health Institute microbiology lab.  The NAAT tests were chosen because of their 
high sensitivity, but they are also expensive and thus would not normally be possible to 
do if scaling up the intervention; a more feasible design for scale would be to focus just 
on a subset of STIs with reliable rapid tests.  Use of laboratory-based NAAT testing also 
required a two to three week period in order to process all of the tests, thus we had to ask 
participants to return to their village study station to pick-up the tests.  Over 90% of 
participants came back to collect their results three weeks later, even in the Control 
group; this is likely due to a combination of the fact that this is a population accustomed 
to research studies, as well as the high level of interest people had in ―knowing their 
status‖ and rechecking it regularly (for both HIV and STIs).  This also had the added 
benefit that we had another contact with study participants to remind them of the study 
and also provide individual post-test counseling (pre-test counseling was provided to all 
at the time of specimen collection).  Individuals who tested positive were provided 
vouchers for themselves and up to five partners for free treatment at the local health 
clinic, and a system was put into place to ensure that the first and second line medicines 
were always available in those clinics.  A critical point is that each of these four urine-
based STIs is curable.  Thus enrollees who test positive for an STI can continue to   18 
participate in the intervention after they have been treated and cured of the infection; 
learning is encouraged through positive reinforcement, and mistakes can be corrected and 
overcome. 
In addition to these urine-based NAAT STI tests, we also measured syphilis and 
HSV2 using blood-based tests.  Because of the low prevalence of syphilis, and because 
HSV2 detects whether the individual has ever contracted HSV2, we elected to only 
measure these blood-based STI‘s at baseline and 12 months, rather than at each 4-month 
interval.   
Finally, we also measured HIV at baseline and one-year follow-up.  We did not 
conditional reward payments on HIV status, in part due to ethical concerns about 
―punishing‖ somebody at the very time when they learn that they have contracted a fatal 
disease.  We were not powered to look at intervention arm effects on HIV, but for 
scientific purposes did want to measure baseline HIV to better characterize our 
population.  Our HIV rates turned out to be lower (just under 4%) than anticipated based 
on regional Demographic and Health Survey data; given the reasonably high rates of HIV 
testing in the population it may be that HIV positive individuals selected themselves out 
of the sample.  We decided to also test HIV at the 12-month endpoint due to the study 
population‘s strong interest in checking their results again.  Although over half of the 
population had received a prior HIV test, study enrollees expressed concerns about 
confidentiality of testing at local clinics, and strong desire for retesting by RESPECT 
study personnel. 
 
Incentive Size and Frequency  
A major design consideration is the size of the incentive.  CCT programs focused 
on uptake have typically relied on formulas to compensate participants on the opportunity 
costs, or time requirements, of complying with programmatic requirements such as 
attending antenatal care visits or taking the child to the clinic for his or her regular check-
ups.  However, in the case of CCT programs designed to encourage safer sexual practices 
and discourage risky ones, the purpose of the incentive is not primarily to compensate the 
individual for the opportunity costs of participating in the program, but rather to change 
the decision calculus of the individual regarding his or her sexual behavior.  The goal   19 
would be to increase the immediate costs associated with risky behavior by increasing the 
possibility of future reward (cash).  Several studies of CM interventions have found a 
positive relationship between the magnitude of the reward and the impact on the target 
behavior (and laboratory-confirmed health impact) (Sindelar et al., 2007; Stitzer and 
Bigelow, 1983), at least during the treatment period; the effect appears to weaken during 
follow up (Higgins et al., 2007).  However, the magnitude of incentive required for 
shaping sexual behavior is unknown.  Preliminary assessments can be obtained through 
focus group discussions, survey data, and discrete choice experiments, but these are no 
substitute for direct measures of impact achieved by randomly assigning different sized 
payments to individuals participants.   
In the RESPECT study, we chose an incentive amount of approximately $20 at 
each 4-month testing point.  Mean earnings in the study population are approximately 
$200 per year, thus staying STI negative could increase income by about 30%, which is 
in a similar ballpark as Mexico‘s Oportunidades program.  This amount was discussed 
extensively with local populations, some of whom argued for much higher amounts 
(which would not be able to be feasibly scaled-up), but others of whom agreed that $20 
sounded reasonable.  We then chose to include a second incentivized arm with a reward 
half that size, in order to test dose-response.  One concern about our ability to test this 
dose response, however, is that randomization is at the individual-level, thus individuals 
in the $10 group may feel ―cheated‖ and respond less robustly than if they were not 
aware of the higher group. 
In addition, we also chose to assess the acceptability and feasibility of lottery-
based incentives.  All enrollees were eligible for a $100 village and gender-specific 
lottery drawing at the 4-month, 8-month, and 12-month testing rounds (thus on average 
the chances of winning were approximately one in 100 at each 4 month time point). 
However, if individuals in the cash reward arms tested STI positive, they were made 
ineligible for the lottery in that round (control enrollees were eligible regardless of their 
STI status, as long as they had not attrited from the project).  This thus equally reinforced 
incentives for both of the incentivized reward arms.  The lottery proved popular, as our 
ex-ante focus groups had predicted (the national lottery is also popular).  Large crowds 
attended each drawing, providing yet another opportunity to communicate project   20 
messaging.  The lottery had two limitations to consider though.  First, some winners were 
individuals known in the community to engage in risky sexual behavior, which cause 
disillusionment among some village members.  Second, the incentive structure was 
confusing to some enrollees, violating the ―KISS‖ principle (keep it simple stupid); this 
could be remedied though in a simpler lottery-only design.  At the end of the study we 
queried individuals about the role of the cash rewards versus the lottery; in general people 
indicated that their behaviors responded to both sets of incentives in roughly equal 
proportions, providing promising evidence for the potential of pursuing (lower cost) 
lottery designs in future interventions.  This needs to be counterbalanced against the 
finding in Table 4 that although respondents generally ―liked‖ both the cash rewards and 
the lottery, they liked the former somewhat more. 
  A separate but related consideration is the frequency and immediacy in which the 
cash incentive is paid out.  Given the unplanned and spontaneous nature of many sexual 
encounters, the incentive needs to be offered frequently enough to keep it ever-present in 
the minds of the target group, and as immediately as possible to reinforce the link 
between the payment and the target behavior.  It seems reasonable to assume, and the CM 
literature has confirmed (Stitzer and Petry, 2006), that larger cash payments given 
frequently have greater impact than smaller payments given less frequently, but it is 
nevertheless unclear how these two dimensions of magnitude and frequency interact.  In 
the RESPECT study we chose to balance the frequency with budgetary imperatives by 
testing each 4 months, although given the lack of guidance in the literature this was 
inevitably a somewhat arbitrary decision. 
  Of additional interest is whether the cash incentive should be paid directly to 
individuals, to a couple, or some other social grouping.  CCT programs for poverty 
alleviation have tended to target households and communities, but the incentive is 
actually paid to the mothers of young children, rather than the fathers or the legal head-
of-household.  This design feature has been a nod to a series of findings that women are 
more likely to use the money on food for the family rather than on alcohol or other 
purchases (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005, Schady and Rosero, 2007).  However, some 
studies of CM interventions have found that the effect size of incentive was greatest if the 
payment was made to a pre-designated group rather than the individual (Jeffery et al.,   21 
1983).  This may be due to the social support provided by the group, or peer pressure, or 
some combination, and the question is whether such a mechanism can or should be 
applied to the sexual relationship.  In the RESPECT study, we chose the clearest and 
most transparent method: paying each individual separately.  Data analysis indicates that 
many of the individuals shared their rewards by buying household goods, but many 
others (both men and women) kept the funds to themselves and did not even share with 
their spouse. 
    
Skill-building to Aid Behavioral Change 
  In order to ensure that participants had the necessary tools to act on the incentives 
for sexual behavior change, we chose to offer monthly (sex segregated) group skill-
building sessions (in addition to individual pre- and post-test counseling each four 
months).  For this purpose we trained local facilitators to deliver a modified version of 
the Stepping Stones curriculum (Jewkes et al., 2008), with sessions on topics such as 
sexual health, condom use, relationship skills, decision-making skills, women‘s roles and 
gender-based violence.  The last of these was particularly important due to the concern 
that women testing STI positive may be subject to violence; for this purpose we also 
carefully monitored for violence events.  Fortunately, reported violence rates during the 
intervention were consistently lower than pre-intervention levels (Krishnan et al., 2011).  
We chose to make these group sessions voluntarily, and 20-30% of enrollees attended 
each month. 
 
Self-reported Degree of Behavioral Change Motivation from Incentives 
To judge the overall perceived effectiveness of the incentive mechanisms used in 
RESPECT, table 4 presents enrollees‘ responses to direct questions regarding how much 
the incentives motivated sexual behavior change.  At both 8-month and 12-month time 
points the low-value and high-value respondents were asked ―how much the cash rewards 
motivated sexual behavior change.‖  After 8-months, 36% of low-value arm (Tsh 10,000) 
respondents stated ―very much‖ and 31% stated ―none.‖  In the high-value arm (Tsh 
20,000), the percent stating ―very much‖ was substantially higher at 59%, with only 21% 
reporting ―none.‖  The control arm respondents were also queried, but as part of this   22 
question each was randomized to a single hypothetical reward amount (Tsh 10,000 / 
20,000 / 50,000 / 100,000) and asked how much that amount would motivate behavior 
change.  Table 4 reports again a consistent dose-response relationship, with higher 
amounts related to higher self-reported behavioral change motivation.  Interestingly, 
those actually enrolled in the reward arms reported higher levels of motivation than did 
the control respondents when reporting about the hypothetical reward scenario. 
These motivation questions were repeated again at the 12-month intervention 
endpoint, as reported in the middle panel of Table 4 (the questions were not asked prior 
to the 8-month survey).  The above dose-response patterns were replicated.  A further 
finding is that reported motivation levels are uniformly higher at 12-months than they 
were at 8-months, suggesting that there may have been further learning and behavior 
change by participants during this interval, which is an argument for repeated rounds of 
incentivized behavior over an extended period of time.  By this endpoint, 79% of the 
high-value arm enrollees reported ―very much‖ motivation, with only 5% reporting no 
motivation. 
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 4 reports on parallel questions that were asked 
at 12-months in regard to the lottery incentives.  We first note that 89% of high-value arm 
respondents reported ―very much‖ motivation from the lottery, which is even higher than 
for the cash rewards.  This is despite the fact that the respondents had already participated 
in two rounds of the lottery, after which they should have been aware that the odds of 
winning the actual 100,000 lottery were approximately 1%, thus the expected value of the 
lottery was far lower than the certain cash rewards.  Second, we note that the responses 
by control individuals (asked to imagine a single hypothetical lottery amount in which 
eligibility was conditioned on negative STI results) were quite similar to those of the 
actual high-value and low-value arm respondents; perhaps the fact that the control arm 
enrollees had already been actually eligible for the lotteries (but regardless of STI status) 
had made them better informed about how the lottery could affect their motivation.  
Third, it is evident from Table 4 that there is not a dose-response relationship between the 
different hypothetical lottery amounts and the degree of projected behavior change 
motivation.  This is despite the fact that these control respondents had all been 
―anchored‖ by the actual lottery amount of Tsh 100,000, and thus might be particularly   23 
expected to react negatively to the lower hypothetical amount of 50,000.  One potential 
explanation for this lack of a dose-response relationship is that the lottery amounts tested 
were all sufficiently high (Tsh100,000 is equal to approximately 40 percent of mean 
annual income in the study population) that virtually all respondents would be motivated 
by the prospect of winning. Indeed, in-depth focus group responses suggested that many 
individuals in this context failed to calculate the relevant expected value (few have 
completed schooling beyond the primary level), and thus were likely making cognitive 
errors that led to greater salience of the lottery than would be rationally expected.  
Although we must be cautious in not over-interpreting these self-reported ―motivation‖ 
questions, and should await publication of further results from the more objective STI 
endpoints, this evidence does suggest that a lottery-based incentive system may be 




Cash incentives have been shown to be effective at shaping behavior in a variety 
of health domains, from improving the uptake of health and educational services among 
the poor, to discouraging unhealthy or risky behaviors, such as substance abuse, smoking, 
and over-eating.  These successes inevitably raise the question of whether they can also 
be applied in areas of sexual and reproductive health beyond contraception (Mauldon, 
2003; Weeden et al., 1986), and in particular to HIV prevention (Haug and Sorenson, 
2006).  A review of countries‘ experiences with CCT programs for poverty alleviation 
and CM provides useful insights into how to design, implement and evaluate a CCT-
based STI/HIV prevention intervention.  The particular experience of the RESPECT 
study finds that such a program can be designed to be efficacious and acceptable.   
Table 5 reports enrollee responses to questions regarding perceived success of the 
trial and which dimensions of the trial they liked and did not like.  Although such 
responses must be interpreted cautiously in light of possible social desirability bias (not 
wanting to offend the interviewer) – indeed there is some variation in responses across 
questions – overall the study appears to be highly acceptable and valued by the study 
population.  This is perhaps not surprising given the substantial amount of cash delivered   24 
by the project, but even control group enrollees (who did not receive cash beyond 
minimal inconvenience fees) responded quite positively about the trial.  But could a trial 
such as this be brought to scale effectively, and cost-effectively? 
CCT programs for poverty alleviation have already been brought to scale in 
several different settings, and therefore have broken the credibility barrier by proving that 
it can be done.  Of course, this has not eliminated concerns about whether incentive 
programs will be equally effective in other settings, particularly those where initial health 
infrastructural investments are very low, as in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2007).   
Furthermore, the cost-effectiveness of CCT programs when compared to 
traditional supply side investments in health and education has not been sufficiently 
explored (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2007).  Cost analyses for STI-based incentive 
programs will need to account for not only the cash payments and monitoring 
infrastructure, but also STI testing costs.  Continued improvements in rapid diagnostic 
testing will help to ameliorate the latter costs over time, but they will still be central 
considerations.  The RESPECT study design was not created for the purposes of scale-up.  
It will be important to experiment with alternative designs to test effectiveness of cheaper 
approaches.  For example, one promising option could be to use a lottery to regularly 
choose random ―winners‖ from a defined population (such as a subvillage), who would 
then be tested for STIs or HIV, and would only receive their lottery payout if negative.  
An ongoing project in Lesotho is further exploring variants of this idea; future studies of 
this type would be a high priority. 
  However, these cost concerns must be balanced against the benefits of an 
effective behavioral intervention, and – again – too little is yet known to draw 
generalizable conclusions at this stage.  Certainly the epidemiological context is highly 
relevant to this discussion, as the costs can be more easily justified in settings where the 
rate of disease transmission is very high.  De Janvry and Sadoulet (2004) have raised 
concerns about inefficiencies in the design of CCT programs, pointing out that large-
scale CCT programs fail to distinguish between those families who would have attended 
pre-natal clinics and sent their children to school regardless of the incentive and those 
who require the incentive to induce the desired behavior.  They conclude that CCT   25 
programs can be made more efficient if they do a better job of targeting the group that 
needs the incentive to be induced to alter their behaviors.  This will pose a continuing 
challenge for STI incentive program design.  Future cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit 
studies of CCTs in different target groups will be needed to inform these types of 
implementation decisions.   
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Table 1: RESPECT baseline knowledge of HIV and prevention methods 
 
 
  Males ( N = 1175)  Females (N =1191) 
Heard of AIDS or HIV?  99.8%   99.9% 
Can die from AIDS  94.3%  92.5% 
 
Knowledge of prevention methods (ABC) 
AIDS can be prevented by: 
Just one partner  97.0%  97.4% 
Regular condom use  85.6%  84.2% 
Abstaining  91.3%  90.9% 
Witchcraft  1.9%  4.1% 
 
Other facts about HIV 
Healthy looking person can be 
HIV infected 
97.2%  95.6% 
Not being infected after having 
sex with HIV positive 
50.2%  42.7% 
Child can be infected during 
pregnancy 
81.6%  88.9% 
 
Source: RESPECT project baseline survey, conducted in 2009 after project recruitment 
and informed consent but prior to receiving project counseling. 
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Table 2: RESPECT baseline HIV test history, status beliefs, and risky behaviors 
 
 
  Males ( N = 1175)  Females (N =1191) 
 Ever tested for HIV?  34.8%  71.9% 
 If yes, when last test?  Males ( N = 409)  Females (N =856) 
         < 12 months ago  45.7%  45.0% 
        12-23 months ago  27.4%  28.6% 
         >= 2 years ago  26.9%  26.4% 
 






Perceived HIV prevalence for 




(N = 1175) 
 
On scale 0-10 what is your risk 
of being HIV positive 
 
2.12 
(N = 1175) 
 
2.2 
(N = 1191) 
 
 
Number of partners in last 4 months 
        0  12.2%  10.4% 
        1  68.1%  86.2% 
        2  15.6%  2.7% 
       More than 2  4.2%  0.7% 
 
Condom use during last sexual intercourse 
With spouse or union  15.1%  13.8% 
With other partner  61.3%  49.5% 
 
Source: RESPECT project baseline survey, conducted in 2009 after project recruitment 
and informed consent but prior to receiving project counseling. 
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Table 3: RESPECT baseline summary statistics, among full-year panel sample and 





























Source: RESPECT project baseline survey, 2009. 
 
Notes: Low SES is an indicator for response<=3 on a 1-7 ladder of subjective social 
status in the community.  Income is an individual‘s annual earnings in thousands of TSh 
(in 2009 the exchange rate for dollars was US $1 ~= Tsh 1100-1300, yielding average 














  Control 0.46 0.54 0.076 *
  Low-value 0.28 0.19 0.064
  High-value 0.26 0.27 0.049 *
Female 0.51 0.43 0.056 *
Age 27.49 25.85 ***
Education
  None 0.12 0.11 0.063
  Primary 0.78 0.75 0.063
  Secondary 0.10 0.13 0.084
Married 0.76 0.61 0.053 ***
Low SES 0.55 0.51 0.061
Income 258.25 223.06
Chlamydia 0.02 0.02 0.058
Gonorrhea 0.01 0.02 0.136
Trichomonas 0.12 0.15 0.077
HSV2 0.35 0.33 0.063
Syphilis 0.02 0.02 0.075
HIV 0.03 0.12 0.212 ***
N 2242 157 0.065Table 4: Stated effects of incentives on motivation to change behavior 
 
Rewards: 8-month survey           How much does/would motivate behavior change? 
   
Arm  Award type  Value  N    








    Low-value  Actual  10000  486 
 
36  21  12  31 
    High-value  Actual  20000  518 
 
59  13  7  21 
    Control  Hypothetical  10000  172 
 
24  21  12  43 
    Control  Hypothetical  20000  264 
 
47  11  10  32 
    Control  Hypothetical  50000  232 
 
57  13  8  23 
    Control  Hypothetical  100000  195 
 
57  7  5  31 
   
                     
                      Rewards: 12-month survey        How much does/would motivate behavior change? 
   
Arm  Award type  Value  N    








    Low-value  Actual  10000  150 
 
57  27  7  9 
    High-value  Actual  20000  160 
 
79  13  4  5 
    Control  Hypothetical  10000  254 
 
51  20  9  19 
    Control  Hypothetical  20000  239 
 
65  19  4  12 
    Control  Hypothetical  50000  279 
 
70  19  3  9 
    Control  Hypothetical  100000  258 
 
77  14  2  8 
   
                     
                      Lottery: 12-month survey           How much does/would motivate behavior change? 
   
Arm  Award type  Value  N    








    Low-value  Actual  100000  209 
 
87  6  2  5 
    High-value  Actual  100000  175 
 
89  4  0  7 
    Control  Hypothetical  50000  345 
 
78  13  2  7 
    Control  Hypothetical  100000  349 
 
83  7  2  7 
    Control  Hypothetical  200000  336 
 
80  10  1  9 
    __________ 
                    Notes: 
                    Control arm respondents were randomly assigned a single hypothetical reward value and a single lottery value, about which the behavior 
change motivation question was asked.  Respondents in the Low-value and High-value arms were asked about their actual reward amounts.  
Low-value and high-value sample sizes are reduced at 12-months because a portion of these respondents were instead randomized to 
questions about other hypothetical arms (not shown). Table 5a: Enrollees’ attitudes towards elements of RESPECT, after 1-year trial 
 
            High-value  Low-value  Control 
What aspects of RESPECT did you like:         
  HIV testing  Very much    96.2  95.3  92.4 
    Somewhat    2.7  3.6  5.1 
    A little    1.0  1.0  2.4 
    None    0.0  0.0  0.0 
             
  STI testing  Very much    98.5  97.2  96.8 
    Somewhat    1.4  2.1  3.0 
    A little    0.2  0.3  0.2 
    None    0.0  0.3  0.0 
             
  Cash rewards  Very much    93.2  87.7  60.1 
    Somewhat    5.6  8.9  24.8 
    A little    1.2  2.8  13.0 
    None    0.0  0.7  2.0 
             
  Lottery  Very much    74.5  69.9  54.4 
    Somewhat    18.6  20.6  27.4 
    A little    5.8  8.1  14.8 
    None    1.0  1.5  3.5 
             
  Free STI treatment  Very much    96.4  96.8  95.0 
    Somewhat    3.1  2.1  3.6 
    A little    0.5  0.8  1.2 
    None    0.0  0.3  0.2 
             
  Individual counseling  Very much    88.0  83.6  82.4 
    Somewhat    9.1  12.8  13.7 
    A little    2.6  3.1  3.8 
    None    0.3  0.5  0.1 
             
  Group counseling  Very much    58.6  54.3  50.0 
    Somewhat    21.0  21.1  20.4 
    A little    17.1  20.9  23.1 
      None     3.3  3.7  6.7   1 
Table 5b: Enrollees’ perceptions of success of RESPECT, after 1-year trial 
 
            High-value  Low-value  Control 
At end of 1-year study did RESPECT:         
  Reduce STIs in village  Very much    91.6  90.3  86.2 
    Somewhat    7.2  7.3  10.9 
    A little    0.7  1.6  2.0 
    None    0.5  0.8  0.9 
             
How did RESPECT study affect:         
  Your life  Greatly improved  74.8  74.8  76.2 
   
Somewhat 
improved  25.2  24.2  22.8 
   
Not much or 
worse  0.0  1.0  1.0 
             
 
Well-being of 
community  Greatly improved  82.1  85.0  83.3 
   
Somewhat 
improved  17.4  14.5  16.0 
   
Not much or 
worse  0.5  1.0  1.0 
 
Notes: All items were drawn from the 12-month RESPECT survey (at endpoint of trial), 
except the final two questions were drawn from the 24-month survey (one year after end 
of the trial). 









Counseling and relationship-skills training
Intervention group
(Conditional cash)
N=1,275
High-value
N=615
Control 
group
N= 1,124
Low-value
N=660